Review of  When Words are Called For by Johnson, Jeff
Essays Philos (2013) 14:104-111                                                         1526-0569  | commons.pacificu.edu/eip 
 
 
_____________________________ 
Corresponding Author: Jeff Johnson 
St. Catherine University 
email – jtjohnson@stkate.edu 
 
 
Book Review | When Words are Called For 
 
Jeff Johnson 
 
Published online: 31 January 2013 
© Jeff Johnson 2013 
 
 
When Words are Called For. Avner Baz. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2012; 256 pages; ISBN 9780674055223. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this remarkable book, we find Avner Baz offering a characterization of ordinary language 
philosophy, defending it against some of its most prominent critics, and showing how 
employing its methods can help get us out of some difficulties in our thinking about 
knowledge.  
 
Doing ordinary language philosophy involves examining examples in which words of 
interest to philosophers might ordinarily be used. This amounts not simply to attending to 
the ways the circumstances surrounding what we ordinarily say make a difference to how to 
take what we say but also to attending to the kinds of circumstances in which saying this or 
that might actually arise. This sort of attention reveals that the things philosophers are 
inclined to say very often wouldn’t ordinarily come up. And in the cases where something 
that sounds very like the sorts of things philosophers say might come up, what it amounts to 
in those examples is quite different from what we would expect. And this difference 
between what philosophers say and what we might ordinarily say is of some interest. On 
examination we find that it’s not at all clear what to make of the things philosophers say. 
 
The aim in attending to how words are ordinarily used, according to Baz, is not to arm 
ourselves with anything like an analysis of the words involved — we don’t come to know 
the meanings of the words in question (at least not in anything like the philosophers’ sense 
of “meanings of words”) as a result of these investigations. Nor do these investigations lead 
us to the conclusion that the things philosophers say are to be regarded as nonsense. Instead, 
these reminders of how our words are ordinarily used bring into question whether we ought 
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to regard the investigations philosophers undertake and the analyses they offer as having 
anything to do with any of the words we ordinarily employ. These reminders are designed 
to loosen the hold of our idea that the claims philosophers are often inclined to make must 
make sense and that the problems to which they give rise are genuine problems. 
 
Here I’ll outline some of Baz’s thinking. Though I’m deeply sympathetic with much of 
what Baz says in this book — it really is an important book — I’ll also try to bring out a 
worry I have with the way Baz tends to characterize what he sees as the fundamental 
difference between the things the philosophers say and what we ordinarily say. 
 
Responding to Criticisms 
 
Ordinary language philosophy has been the subject of some pretty severe scrutiny. In 
particular, the business of sizing up what we might be up to in using philosophically 
interesting words like “know” and its cognates in the course of our lives — our lives, that is, 
outside of philosophy — has captured the attention of more than a few critics. Baz offers 
what I take to be successful responses to some of the most influential of these attacks. 
 
Searle says we ought to reject the idea that meanings of words change in different contexts, 
a view he attributes to ordinary language philosophers, since if they did we’d be unable, for 
instance, to get answers to questions we ask — the words figuring in the answer, after all, 
find themselves in a different context than the words figuring in the question. Baz points out 
that Searle mistakenly assumes that ordinary language philosophy is in the business of 
offering an analysis of the words it investigates. He also makes it clear that Searle simply 
assumes there must be some specifiable things that count in every case as the meanings of 
our words but that Searle nowhere indicates how these things could be specified without 
appealing to how our words are ordinarily used. 
 
Geach argues that because expressions like “I know that...” can find a home in each of the 
premises of a valid modus ponens argument, we ought to suppose that the sense of the 
expression in question must remain the same across those different contexts. So again we 
have an argument designed to raise into question the thought that expressions mean 
different things in different contexts, a view which Baz does not hold. But here too we find 
an argument designed to raise into question the idea that we should take saying “I know 
that...” to be a way of assuring someone of something rather than as a description. If 
expressions that make up the argument can be true, then they must be descriptions of how 
things are. Baz responds by bringing Geach’s argument out of the ether and asking us to 
imagine someone actually offering it. In that sort of example, we find it would be unclear 
(at best) how to make sense of it and so that the argument isn’t a very good one after all. 
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Soames says we need to take it for granted that there are fixed meanings of our words in 
order to account for the compositionality of language. Because the methods ordinary 
language philosophers employ reveal that what we say comes to different things in different 
circumstances, ordinary language philosophers can’t be busy about discovering meanings. 
Baz responds to this by pointing out that Soames’ argument counts meanings as “theoretical 
posits” and because of that what he’s on about are clearly different from what we’re 
interested in when we ordinarily ask after the meaning of this or that word. 
 
Ultimately, the trouble Baz sees in each of these attempts to criticize ordinary language 
philosophy is that they take for granted a conception of meaning, what he calls the 
“prevailing conception of meaning”, which has it that there exists apart from the ordinary 
uses of words something that counts as the meanings of those words, that these meanings 
have to do with what it is to which our words refer, and that what’s said in a sentence is a 
function of the meanings of the words which make it up. Because ordinary language 
philosophy constitutes a challenge to that conception of meaning, simply assuming it’s true 
in an effort to repudiate ordinary language philosophy can only amount to begging the 
question.     
 
Extending the Method 
 
After defending ordinary language philosophy against these attacks, Baz turns to a 
discussion of the ways it can be responsive to contemporary disputes about knowledge. 
Here I’ll outline those disputes and identify Baz’s response to them. 
 
Williamson and the experimental philosophers disagree over the role of appeals to intuitions 
in sizing up whether knowledge is present in cases like those offered by Gettier. Williamson 
defends helping ourselves to intuitions by counting them as an extension of our ordinary 
ability to make judgments about whether people know in the course of our everyday lives. 
The experimental philosophers, of course, suspect our intuitions and think we’d better see 
what ordinary people would say when asked of the cases of interest whether in fact the 
characters they feature really do know this or that. 
 
Contextualists and anti-contextualists disagree over the impact the different contexts that 
can surround saying we know have on whether or not saying we know is true. 
Contextualists offer cases in which it appears that whether it’s true that someone knows has 
much to do with the context of the case in question — depending on the contextualist you 
ask, assessing whether someone knows requires sizing up the relevant alternatives to what’s 
claimed to be known, for example, or the stakes involved in whether what’s said to be 
known is so. Anti-contextualists think none of this matters at all to whether a person can be 
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rightly said to know. What matters is simply whether knowledge is there to be reported on, 
and whether it is doesn’t depend on changes in context.   
 
Among the troubles Baz sees in each of these disputes is that both parties assume that it’s 
always in order to ask whether a person knows this or that because knowledge is either there 
to be reported on or it’s not. Baz finds that when we imagine ourselves inhabiting the 
examples these philosophers imagine it’s hard to see why someone in those examples would 
ever ask such a thing. Of interest to the folks in the examples where questions about a 
person’s basis for saying she knows might arise, for instance, what’s at issue is not so much 
whether a person knows, but whether the thing they say they know is so. The result is that 
Williamson, the experimental philosophers, the contextualists, and the anti-contextualists 
are all tempted to ask a question which has no place in the examples they imagine. Without 
being able to make sense of their question, it’s hard to see how to take seriously any of the 
responses they offer. 
 
Because these two disputes, intractable as they seem, turn on the common assumption that 
the questions at their center make sense, we have reason to resist getting caught up in those 
disputes and reason to release ourselves from those disputes if we should find ourselves in 
their grip. 
 
Throughout these sections of the book, Baz offers his own diagnosis of what’s gone wrong 
with these philosophers’ questions. To his mind, what we’re up to in asking and answering 
questions about these imaginary cases is quite a bit different from what we’re up to when 
we ordinarily ask and answer such questions. Where questions ordinarily arise, he suggests, 
they do so in connection with some point. Where words are ordinarily deployed, he 
suggests, there is some point to their deployment. In contrast to this, the questions 
philosophers are tempted to ask about these imaginary cases are without any (ordinary) 
point. And it’s because these questions are without any (ordinary) point, Baz suggests, it’s 
not clear how to make sense of them. It’s for this reason that Baz regards the things 
philosophers often say as merely idling.  
 
My Worries 
 
I’m deeply sympathetic with Baz’s thought that there are important differences to be 
marked between the kinds of things philosophers say about their austere examples and the 
kinds of things we may say or think in the course of talking to one another. And I’m 
appreciative, too, of his observation that the lack of texture, as it were, of the examples with 
which philosophers busy themselves is likely to be an important part of the story about why 
they find themselves sometimes fighting over what to make of those examples.  
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What I’m curious about is Baz’s thought that our ordinary talk is always connected to 
points. The thought that there is always a point to the things we ordinarily say seems to me 
to be a very tempting thing to think. And it certainly seems to be a tempting way to carve a 
distinction between the kinds of things philosophers often say and what we ordinarily say. 
But I want to see what to make of it. And I know of no place to turn in order to see what to 
make of it apart from examples which feature talk about points. So I’ll turn to those now. 
I’ll do a little ordinary language philosophy. 
 
Suppose you and I are out for coffee. Suppose that after passing some time in talk our 
conversation turns toward baseball. Suppose we’re trying to get clear on what the real 
trouble is with the Minnesota Twins. I’m in the middle of building my case for having a 
little optimism about next season and you interrupt. I imagine that if I want to see my 
argument through I might protest by saying something like this: “Hey, I was making a 
point”. Or take another case. Suppose you don’t interrupt. Suppose that as I’m making my 
case we find ourselves drifting into wisecracks about the Metrodome. I soon realize, though, 
that I’d lost track of my earlier remarks. So I suggest we retrace our steps. “Wait,” I say, 
“there was a point I was trying to make”. Or, to take still another case, suppose we meet 
over coffee for our weekly reading group. After our usual preliminary pleasantries I dive 
headlong into my take on the material on deck. Let’s suppose, though, that this is hasty. 
You recall that we’ve still got unfinished business to tend to. So you look down at your 
notes from the previous week and you say, “Let’s start with some points we left off on last 
week.” 
  
Here are some examples which feature points — examples, that is, in which we say we are 
or were making points, that there is or was a point to what we were saying, that we were on 
a time discussing some points. In these sorts of examples, talk about points seems bound up 
with things we take to be relatively important to the conversation, with things we want to 
see through or that we want to revisit.  
 
We don’t take everything we say to be especially important (not all of us anyway) and much 
of it isn’t stuff we’re particularly eager to revisit. Though I might be taken aback if you 
move on to last week’s business before we’ve finished exchanging our usual preliminary 
pleasantries, I certainly wouldn’t protest by saying there was a point to what I was saying. If 
our conversation drifts before I finish telling you what I made for dinner last night, I 
certainly wouldn’t steer us back when I realize we’ve drifted by suggesting there was a 
point I was trying to make. And I’m not sure how you could take my following up a 
wisecrack about the Metrodome with, “there was a point to that joke, you know”. Not, at 
least, if it was just a joke. 
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There are lots of other kinds of cases to consider. Suppose we’re talking over coffee and 
you see that the person at the table next to us has left her purse behind. You shout to her as 
she’s walking out the door, “Hey!” If I haven’t also noticed her purse, I might ask you what 
the point of that was. Or suppose a mutual friend drops by and that, unbeknownst to me, 
you two are at odds with one another. Perhaps you’re cordial when he says hello, but as 
soon as he leaves you curse him in a whisper. So I might ask in such a case, “What was the 
point of that?”  
 
In these cases something threw me. In order to get my bearings, I asked after the point. And 
in each of these cases, there was a point to what you said. 
 
But I see too that in cases where I’m thrown, there need not be any point to what you say. 
Suppose we’re talking about movies we’ve lately seen and as we do you’ve got your eye on 
the ducks in the lake across the street. You ask, quite out of the blue, whether mallards with 
green heads are males or females. Your question here is surely a surprise, especially if I 
don’t also see the ducks. “What was the point of that?”, I might ask. And here I think you 
could say that there was no point, but that you were just curious or that you were just 
wondering. It’s worth noting that even though there need not have been a point, I may 
nevertheless offer up an answer to your question.  
 
Sometimes, too, we find ourselves in conversation with people who aren’t terribly wedded 
to structure. Their remarks roam, they try things out, they run things by us. These are people 
who like thinking things through. Suppose we fix on something they say, something curious 
enough to give rise to the question, and ask what the point of it was. I expect they could say 
that there was no point, that they were just exploring, that they were just trying it out or 
running it by us, or that they were just thinking something through. And of course we’d do 
well to keep in mind in the face of these sorts of conversations that they’re often a welcome 
change from conversations with those who always have a point to make — those for whom 
there’s always some point to what they say. Those people are sometimes hard to bear. 
 
Here, then, are some more examples that feature talk of points. So far, though, it seems to 
me that the examples come up short in giving substance to the thought that there are always 
points to what we ordinarily say. There are, of course, examples in which there are points 
that we mean to be making or points we want to revisit, but there are also examples in 
which there appear to be none. Sometimes we’re just joking or we’re just exchanging 
pleasantries, sometimes we’re just exploring or trying something out, sometimes we’re just 
curious or we’re just wondering. 
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Maybe a much simpler case will help. Maybe a case stripped of peculiar remarks or morals 
to the story or matters of much import will betray the points Baz suggests are connected to 
our talk.  
 
Suppose we head back into the coffee shop. This time we order some pastries, and I alone 
order coffee. Suppose now that you ask, “What was the point of that?” Though there are lots 
of things you could be asking about, we’ll suppose your question is focused on my coffee 
order. You ask, “What was the point of that?” Now I have to confess that when I think 
about this question in the shadow of the examples we surveyed above, it’s a little unclear to 
me how I’m to take it. I want to fill in the example with details to help me see what you 
could be asking. 
 
Maybe I’d ordered the coffee to go. Maybe you’d figured we were staying here and you 
wanted to get straight on whether I had that same idea. Or maybe I ordered decaf and you 
happen to stand in opposition to decaf. Your question, then, amounts to this: “What’s the 
point of ordering decaf?” Here I guess I might say, “I don’t want to be up all night”. But 
then again, if decaf is what I usually order, I might say something like this: “What do you 
mean what’s the point? I always get decaf”. Or maybe we’ve just dropped by the coffee 
shop for the pastries. Maybe you’ve already got coffee for us in the Thermos in the car. So 
maybe your question is a question about why I’m buying coffee when we already have 
some. These are some ways I could make heads or tails of your question. But apart from 
these special sorts of circumstances, it’s unclear to me what you could be asking in asking 
what the point of my order was.  
 
Things are no better if I say to you, just after ordering my coffee, “there was a point to my 
ordering coffee”. There is no doubt that this is a strange thing for me to say. But I suppose 
it’s not impossible to make sense of it. Maybe you’re the one who usually foots the bill 
when we go for coffee and here I’m making it clear that you should put your wallet away, 
that I’m picking up the tab this time. I guess that may be a bit of a stretch. Here’s a way to 
take it. Maybe you make horrible coffee and you’ve got some in the Thermos out in the car 
waiting for us. So my saying there was a point to my ordering coffee is on the way towards 
letting you in on my view of your awful ways with coffee. Or maybe this is better. Maybe 
you’re already on your way out the door. Maybe you think I’ve got my coffee but I haven’t 
yet. You holler to me, “C’mon, let’s go!” So my saying what I do amounts to letting you 
know I haven’t yet received my coffee. However the details go, I see that I need to import 
some in order to make something out of what I say here. Without these special 
circumstances to help, I’m once again at a loss for what to make of my saying what I do.  
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Suppose that I say what I say to the barista rather than to you. I look her in the eye after I 
order and say “there was a point to my ordering coffee”. Once again, this is odd. But there’s 
a way to make something of it. Maybe because she is so busy she has forgotten my order. 
So what I say is a (snarky) reminder. Or maybe it becomes apparent to me after I ordered, 
since her conversation with her friend continues unhindered, that I am being ignored. But I 
decide I will not be ignored. I raise my voice and I make my stand. So here again there are 
some ways to make heads or tails of my allegation that there was a point to my ordering 
coffee. But if I simply order coffee, it’s hard for me to see what I could be saying in saying 
to anyone “there was a point to my ordering coffee.”  
 
In advance of thinking of examples which feature talk about points, I was tempted to go in 
for the picture that there are always points connected to the things we ordinarily say. In 
view of these examples, though, I’m now inclined to try to resist the advances of that 
picture until I have reasons for thinking it’s so. 
 
 
